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Loss aversion is the disproportionate distaste 
for subjective losses, compared to equal-sized 
subjective gains. It was originally discovered 
in laboratory choices among monetary risks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), but has since 
become evident in allocations, behavior, and 
institutional rules in many markets. As one exam-
ple, Thaler (1980) was the first to conjecture 
that people would be reluctant to buy consumer 
goods at a price above a “reference price,” due 
to disutility from the subjective loss of paying 
more than a reference price. (Consumer back-
lash about the car service Uber’s modern “surge 
pricing” during demand shocks is a potential 
illustration.) Not long after Thaler’s conjecture, 
Putler (1992) reported corroborating evidence 
that elasticities of demand for eggs were about 
twice as high for price increases (−0.78) than 
for decreases (−0.33), consistent with pricing 
reference-dependence and loss aversion.
As with many initial empirical results 
reported in behavioral economics, the surprising 
early evidence of asymmetry in price elasticities 
inspired many alternative explanations extend-
ing rational choice explanations. In the case of 
elasticity asymmetries, consumer heterogene-
ity is an obvious plausible alternative (Bell and 
Lattin 2000). However, careful estimation in 
marketing science in the last two decades, using 
high-quality choice data from supermarket scan-
ner panel data, shows substantial consumer loss 
aversion toward price changes of the kind Putler (1992) first documented, even when  alternative 
explanations including heterogeneity can be 
ruled out.
Loss averse consumers make substantially 
more purchases when prices are discounted 
against their reference price, and make dispro-
portionately fewer purchases when prices are 
increased. However, this dynamic pattern does 
not uniquely identify loss aversion as the cause 
of this behavior (loss aversion simply magnifies 
the drop in demand after a sale, compared to a 
reference-independent model). A sensible alter-
native explanation is that opportunistic buyers 
who anticipate their future demands “stockpile” 
items that are on sale temporarily (see Bell, 
Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999). When the sale 
is over, demand is temporarily dried up because 
price-sensitive consumers have already stocked 
up on the goods they want most.
We test a new prediction of the reference-de-
pendent pricing model that cannot be attributed 
to stockpiling. We call this the “substitution 
effect.” If reference prices influence sales, then 
the relative value of a product, once it is no 
longer on sale, will go down in comparison to 
a substitute product which did not experience a 
similar sale period. Reference-dependent con-
sumers will then buy less of the post-sale prod-
uct and will buy (relatively) more of substitute 
products. The change in relative sales of a prod-
uct, post-sale, and its substitutes can therefore 
provide information about the extent of refer-
ence-dependence in consumer buying.
A closely related phenomenon called “regret 
devaluation,” has been described in psychology (Arkes, Kung, and Hutzel 2002). Regret deval-
uation occurs when passing up an initial choice 
decreases the likelihood that the same choice 
will be made later, on less valuable terms which 
are still marginally beneficial. Inaction due to 
regret devaluation is obviously an economic 
error because it lets previous history influence a 
cost-benefit calculation that should only be for-
ward-looking. Tykocinski and Pittman (2001) 
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showed this effect experimentally for post-sale 
product non-purchase in hypothetical consumer 
choice. Stock investors also tend to deliberately 
not repurchase stocks they have sold, after a sub-
sequent capital gain (Weber and Welfens 2011 
and Frydman and Camerer 2014). Our study 
applies the field-data approach from the latter 
stock market domain to the consumer domain, 
for which no field data have yet been reported.
I. Data
Our full dataset includes online sales records 
for a large retailer of hardware and household 
products, over a period of 222 days from April 
29, 2011 to December 6, 2011. A total of 6,039 
items were available, generating $40.6 million 
in sales over 2.18 million units sold. Most items 
are frequently discounted, and the best-selling 
items are discounted most often.
A crucial step in measuring the substitution 
effect is defining which products are substitutes. 
In standard theory, substitutes are products 
which have positive price cross-elasticity (i.e., 
a price increase in one product increases sales 
of its substitute). However, this elasticity-based 
measure seems to work surprisingly poorly in 
our data. A simple inspection of product pairs 
which have large cross-price elasticities shows 
many which are just as implausible as substi-
tutes, perhaps due to the large number of SKUs, 
to daily variability, or to omitted variables.1
Therefore, we obtained a list of the top 100 
selling products and their perceived substitutes 
from the retailer. This list is typically used by 
the retailer to present similar items during a 
web search on the retailer’s site for a particular 
product. Upon closer inspection of this list, we 
removed a handful of product pairs which were 
clearly not substitutes, resulting in a total of 204 
pairs of substitutable goods. Only 65 of the top 
100 items had clear substitutes, with a maxi-
mum of 11 substitutes for one of the items. Each 
item on average had about three substitutes. In 
what follows, we will refer to each such pair of 
products as a “substitute pair,” and use the termi-
nology “good A” to denote the main good which 
1 We computed the cross-elasticity of the top selling 
SKU, “45 Watt Solar Panel,” against the top 1,000 SKUs. 
The two SKUs that had the highest cross-elasticity score 
were: “6-inch Digital Calipers” and “1,200 lb. capacity air 
motorcycle lift.” 
was on sale, and “good B” to denote the substi-
tutable good.
We show an illustrative example of the substi-
tution effect in Figure 1 of the sale of two sub-
stitute products: $50 and $100 gift cards. The 
dots at the bottom of the graph indicate discount 
periods for $100 and $50 gift cards (in black 
and gray, respectively). Sales of the gift cards 
are plotted in the top portion of the graph. As 
expected, the sales of $100 gift cards (in black) 
increase when a discount is offered and go down 
once the discount is over (on September 18). 
More interestingly, once the discount period 
ends, sales of $50 gift cards (in gray) go up.
II. Estimation
We use a simple logit model of the choice 
between the two goods in a substitute-pair. Our 
model is motivated by a simple model of con-
sumer decision-making. The utility from good 
A is given by
  u A =  v A − α p A − (λ − 1) × (  p A −  p ref )
 × I(  p A ,  p ref ) +  ϵ A ,
where  I(p, q) is a 0–1 indicator function that takes 
the value of one if  p > q and zero otherwise.
The utility from the substitute good B is
  u B =  v B − α p B +  ϵ B . 
Figure 1. Example of Substitution Effect:  
Sales of $50 Gift Cards Increase after Discount 
Period for $100 Gift Cards Ends
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We assume that the  ϵ s are independently 
extreme value distributed. Then the choice 
probability for good A is a familiar logit expres-
sion. Using the value and price differences 
 v ∗ =  v A −  v B and  p ∗ =  p A −  p B , then
 Pr (A) = [1 + exp (−1 × [ v ∗ − α p ∗ − (λ − 1)]
 × (  p A −  p ref ) × I(  p a ,  p ref ))] −1 .
The odds ratio of purchasing A relative to B is
 Pr (A)/Pr (B) = exp ( v ∗ − α p ∗ − (λ − 1)
 × (  p A −  p ref ) × I(  p a ,  p ref )) .
In the aggregate, the market share for good 
A is just equal to  Pr (A) . Hence, the log market 
share ratio of the two goods A and B is just equal 
to
(1)  log (  S A  ______ 1 −  S A ) =  v ∗ − α p ∗ − (λ − 1) 
 × ( p A −  p ref ) × I(  p a ,  p ref ). 
We have run two specifications of the 
regression above on the 204 substitute-pairs 
we described above. Each observation is a 
“ substitute-pair/day.” The specifications use 
different histories for the trailing reference price 
p ref : (1)  p ref is the price on the previous day; and (2)  p ref is the average price from the five previ-
ous days.
Results are reported in Table 1. Column 1 
contains the results using the previous day’s 
price as the reference price, while column 2 con-
tains the results using the average price from the 
past five days for  p ref . Note that in equation (1), 
there is already a minus sign in front of  (λ − 1) , 
so that a positive coefficient for this variable in 
the table implies that  λ > 1 . Moreover, in all 
specifications we have included substitute-pair 
fixed effects, to control for heterogeneity across 
products in our dataset.2
2 Because of these fixed effects, the magnitudes of the 
estimated regression coefficients are not comparable across 
Tables 1 and 2. 
The results are consistent with the pres-
ence of reference-dependence and a substi-
tution effect. The value of  λ is significantly 
above one (especially for the results utilizing 
the five-day definition of  p ref , in column 2). To 
interpret the magnitude, we should compare 
the value of  λ to that of the price coefficient 
 α . For the results in column 2 of Table 1, we 
have  λ − 1 = 0.00116 , which is almost equal 
in magnitude to −0.00110, the coefficient  α on 
the price difference  p A −  p B . That is, a dollar 
increase in the “loss”  (  p A −  p ref ) has about the 
same effect on demand for good A as a dollar 
increase in the price of good A.
A. Behavior of Experienced Consumers
A potential moderator of the loss aversion 
effect is the amount of experience customers 
have. Evidence from labor supply of cab  drivers (e.g., Camerer et al. 1997) and ownership of 
condominiums (Genesove and Mayer 2001) 
suggests that as people acquire market experi-
ence, the effect of historical reference points is 
reduced.
Therefore, it is useful to measure the extent of 
the substitution effect depending on how active 
consumers are in this online market. Unique 
identification of 861,000 customers is available 
in the transaction records. The total amount of 
purchases by each customer shows power law 
characteristics, with the majority of items being 
purchased by a relatively small number of con-
sumers. This customer heterogeneity enables 
us to separate customers into “experienced” 
Table 1—Estimates of log-Share Equation for 
Product A: All Sales
Variable Coefficient Coefficient(1) (2)
 p A −  p B −0.00135 −0.00110(0.00018)*** (0.00018)***
 λ − 1 0.00044 0.00116
(0.00017)** (0.00019)***
cons =  v A −  v B 0.29062 0.28735(0.01106)*** (0.01110)***
Observations 22,477 22,049
Subst.-pair FX Yes Yes
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and “inexperienced” buyers based on total pur-
chases. Some of the large customers are institu-
tions, or secondary retailers which fulfill their 
inventory online. We eliminate 143 customers 
whose total orders exceed $10,000 , and 17,800 
customers whose total orders are less than $1.
Then we split the sales data by the total sales 
volume in dollar amounts per customer after 
removing the outliers. The top 50 percent of 
customers had sales of $25.7 million, while the 
bottom 50 percent of customers had total sales 
of $2.67 million.
Table 2 shows results which include main 
effects and variable interactions for the top 50 
percent of the consumers (the most experienced, 
heavy-volume buyers). The top customers have 
a positive interaction with the price differen-
tial  p A −  p B , which implies a lower price elas-
ticity that is less negative, closer to zero. They 
also have a large negative interaction with the 
 reference-dependence variable  λ − 1 , which 
means they are less reference-dependent than 
 lower-experience customers. The latter finding 
is consistent with some other evidence that deci-
sion experience reduces a simple kind of refer-
ence-dependence (such as the backward-looking 
influence of past prices specified here).
III. Discussion
Loss-aversion has been documented in psy-
chology experiments and in many areas of empir-
ical social science. Losses are always defined 
relative to a point of reference. We assume con-
sumers recall a short history of previous prices 
to create a reference price, and are averse to sub-
jective losses (prices higher than the reference 
price). This utility specification predicts (as con-
jectured earlier in psychology) that when a prod-
uct sale ends, people will be reluctant to buy that 
same product post-sale, and will therefore more 
strongly prefer substitute products than a model 
without  reference-dependence predicts.
We report tentative evidence of this effect 
using a large dataset from an online hardware 
retailer. The specification shows a small effect of 
loss aversion on post-sale purchases.
One criticism of our findings that we cannot 
currently address empirically is that in order for 
the consumers to exhibit loss aversion and pre-
fer substitute products, they need to know past 
prices—including when items are put on sale 
and when they are removed from sale. Since we 
only have data when a sale occurs, we are lim-
ited by the data in finding out if the consumer 
has actually seen the past prices before making 
a sale. Further exploration in our dataset, and 
field-to-lab experiments, should be useful mov-
ing forward.
Consumer reference dependence, even if 
observed in just a subset of goods, has import-
ant implications for competitive strategy, pric-
ing, and the timing of promotions. According 
to prevailing theory, firms could offer items at 
discounts, or have promotions, for rational con-
sumers in order to take sales from their compet-
itors (Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999). 
However, if consumers are loss averse, and not 
prone to stockpiling, then discounts and pro-
motions have complicated effects once the sale 
period is over, and consumers can switch to 
competitors’ offerings.
Our data contributes to a fuller picture, based 
on data ranging from neuroscientific measure-
ment to active markets in housing, consumer 
products, stocks, and more, about how loss aver-
sion affects economic activity. We also show the 
first tentative evidence from field data for a “sub-
stitution effect” of post-sale effects on substitute 
products, which invites many other related kinds 
of empirical exploration.
Table 2—Estimates of log-Share Equation for 
Product A: Top versus Bottom 50 Percent in Sales 
Volume (Experience)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(1) (2)
top50 0.13648 0.11492
(0.03497)*** (0.03615)**
 p A −  p B −0.01204 −0.01052(0.00158)*** (0.00164)***
top50 ×  (  p A −  p B ) 0.00980 0.00888(0.00156)*** (0.00162)***
 λ − 1 0.00444 0.01635(0.00542) (0.00696)**
top50 × ( λ − 1 ) −0.00362 −0.01200(0.00543) (0.00698)*
cons =  v A −  v B 0.22385 0.23513(0.03499)*** (0.03612)***
Observations 21,492 21,053
Subst.-pair FX Yes Yes
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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